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The Debate over North Korea 
VICTOR D. CHA 
DAVID C. KANG 
Much as political scientists would like to believe otherwise, the 
strength of any new U.S. foreign policy doctrine historically stands not on its 
principles and logic, but on its material results. In this regard, there is no deny 
ing that U.S. military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capture of Saddam 
Hussein, the start of nuclear talks with Iran, and the agreement by Libya's Mu 
ammar el-Qaddafi to submit to international nuclear inspections are impressive 
even to critics of the Bush administration. Although each of these develop 
ments is far from conclusive, they offer arguable evidence of the Bush doc 
trine's effectiveness. Yet, one member of the "axis of evil" remains recalcitrant? 
the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). In social 
science terms, the DPRK remains a "hard test" of the Bush doctrine's effective 
ness at rolling back nuclear capabilities in rogue regimes. Unlike the suspected 
or potential nuclear weapons programs of Iraq or Libya, North Korea's pro 
gram is real, developing, and already most likely churning out nuclear weapons. 
North Korean officials reportedly are fond of telling their American interlocu 
tors that the United States should stop trying to roll back North Korea's nuclear 
weapons programs and should start thinking about how to live with a nuclear 
North Korea. 
Indeed, the DPRK has emerged in the past decade as the subject of the 
most divisive foreign policy issues for the United States and its allies in Asia. 
Interested parties have disagreed vehemently over the regime's intentions and 
goals and over the appropriate strategy that the United States should employ 
in dealing with this country. 
VICTOR D. CHA is associate professor of government and D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair in 
Asian Studies at Georgetown University. He is the award-winning author of Alignment Despite Antag 
onism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle and coauthor, with David Kang, of Nuclear North Korea. 
Cha serves as an independent consultant of the U.S. government and financial private sector and has 
testified before Congress on Asian security issues. DAVID C. KANG is associate professor of govern 
ment and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College. He is the 
author of Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines and co 
author of Nuclear North Korea. 
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The debates over North Korea's bombshell admission in October 2002 of 
a second secret nuclear weapons program, over their withdrawal from the Nu 
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and over the ensuing crisis in 2003 are 
only the most proximate illustrations of the perennial division of views on the 
opaque regime. Many "hawks" or hardliners assert that Pyongyang's conduct 
not only amounted to a violation of a series of nonproliferation agreements 
(that is, the NPT, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, and the 1992 Ko 
rean Denuclearization Declaration) but also revealed the fundamentally un 
changed and "evil" intentions of the Kim Jong II regime. Hence, to hardliners, 
the only policy worth pursuing is isolation and containment, abandoning the 
"sunshine" policy of unconditional engagement made famous by former presi 
dent Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea).1 Others 
argue, by contrast, that North Korea's need for such a secret program, albeit 
in violation of standing agreements, derives from basic insecurity and fears of 
U.S. preemption. In this vein, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju's admission 
of the secret nuclear program, this view purports, was a "cry for help" to draw 
a reluctant Bush administration into direct talks.2 The former denigrate the lat 
ter as weak-kneed appeasers. The latter dismiss the former as irresponsible 
hawkish ideologues. 
The North Korean problem, moreover, has become intricately tied to parti 
san politics: rivalries between the executive branch and Congress, controversies 
over intelligence assessments, the viability of the nonproliferation regime, the 
efficacy of homeland defense, and differing assessments of the utility of deter 
rence versus preemption in U.S. security doctrine. That is a pretty impressive 
record of troublemaking for the small, closed, and arguably most backward 
country in the post-Cold War world! 
Obviously, the crux of the concern over North Korea stems from the threats 
it poses to its neighbors with its conventional military forces, ballistic missiles, 
and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. North Korea boasts a 1.1 million 
man army in forward positions bearing down on the border separating the two 
Koreas (the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ). It is infamously known as an aggres 
sive exporter of ballistic missile technology to regimes such as Iran and Paki 
stan. Its drive for nuclear weapons in earnest dates back to the 1980s, and its 
interest in them to even before then. Many experts believe the DPRK holds 
one of the largest stockpiles of biological and chemical agents in the world. And 
at the same time that the regime militarily empowers itself, it starves its citizens 
at home. This combination of policies elicits a plethora of colorful epithets and 
1 Victor Gilinsky, "North Korea as the Ninth Nuclear Power?" Nautilus Institute Policy Forum 
Online, PFO 02-10A, accessed at http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0210A_Victor.html, 22 October 
2002; "Answering North Korea," Washington Post, 18 October 2002; and "North Korea and the End 
of the Agreed Framework," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1605,18 October 2002. 
2 
Jimmy Carter, "Engaging North Korea," New York Times, 27 October 2002; Leon Sigal, "A 
Bombshell that's Actually an Olive Branch," Los Angeles Times, 18 October 2002; and Jekuk Chang, 
"Pyongyang's New Strategy of Trank Admission,' 
" 
Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online PFO02 
11 A, accessed at http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0211A_Chang.html, 24 October 2002. 
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hyperbole concerning the regime and its leader, Kim Jong II. A major U.S. 
based news magazine covered the unexpected death of the first leader of North 
Korea, Kim II Sung, in July 1994, with the cover story, "The Headless Beast."3 
A Washington Post (29 December 2002) op-ed contribution referred to North 
Korean leader Kim Jong II as a "radioactive lunatic."4 The cover story of News 
week (13 January 2003) carried a picture of the North Korean leader, clad in 
chic black, with the caption "Dr. Evil." Greta Van Susteren introduced a Fox 
News story on Kim Jong II with the opening question, "Is he insane or sim 
ply diabolical?"5 
Policy on North Korea has become a political football. In South Korea, the 
conservatives bash the liberal incumbent government over what they term an 
appeasement of North Korea. Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy has become so 
politicized that one can no longer distinguish between criticisms of the policy 
and character assassinations of the president. In the United States as well, en 
gagement of North Korea and the "Agreed Framework" have become such a 
partisan issue that one cannot tell whether detractors object to the merits of the 
policy or the policy's association with the Clinton administration. Congressmen 
Benjamin Gilman and Christopher Cox claimed a U.S. policy of engagement 
with North Korea was the equivalent of entering "a cycle of extortion with 
North Korea" and nothing more than a "one-sided love affair."6 While some 
saw engagement during the Clinton administration as one of the "unsung suc 
cess stories" of American foreign policy,7 it was elsewhere condemned as "the 
screwiest policy... ever seen."8 While some saw incentives as a responsible way 
to try to transform the regime, outspoken figures such as Senator John McCain 
accused the Clinton administration of being "intimidated" by a puny country 
and charged that the American president had become a "co-conspirator" with 
DPRK leader Kim Jong II.9 Some even argued, moreover, that the United 
States was encouraging North Korean aggression with a policy of appeasement 
that rewarded bad behavior and 
"encouraged all these crazy people over in 
North Korea to believe we are weaklings because we are giving them every 
thing they want."10 Pat Buchanan criticized both the Clinton and Bush adminis 
trations for giving Kim Jong II a "fruit basket" and "sweet reason," rather than 
a "tomahawk missile."11 
3 
Newsweek, July 1994, cited in Bruce Cumings, "The Structural Basis of Anti-Americanism in the 
Republic of Korea," (unpublished paper presented at Georgetown University, 30 January 2003): 26. 
4 
Mary McGrory, "Bush's Moonshine Policy," op-ed, Washington Post, 29 December 2002. 
5 Fox News, 15 January 2003,10:08 pm, cited in Cumings, "The Structural Basis of Anti-American 
ism," 25. 
6 Press release by Benjamin Gilman, 17 September 1999; and statement by Christopher Cox, Hear 
ing of the House International Relations Committee, 13 October 1999. 
7 Lee Hamilton, "Our Stake in Asia's Nuclear Future," Washington Times, 13 May 1998. 
8 Statement by Dana Rohrbacher, Hearings of the House International Relations Committee, 24 
March 1999. 
9 Statement by John McCain on the Senate floor, Congressional Record, 23 June 1994. 
10 Statement by Dana Rohrbacher, Hearings of the House International Relations Committee, 24 
March 1999 and 13 October 1999. 
11 Patrick J. Buchanan, "The Great Equalizer," The American Conservative (10 February 2003): 7. 
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A Debate, Not Hyperbole 
These statements are a small sample of the degree to which discussion on North 
Korea has become emotionally charged and ideological. Rarely does good pol 
icy that serves American and allied interests emerge from such emotional and 
one-sided debates. Our purpose in this article is to step back from the histrion 
ics and offer a reasoned, rational, and logical debate on the nature of the North 
Korean regime and the policy that should be followed by the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea. Each of us has our own orientation toward the prob 
lem, ranging from more pessimistic to optimistic assessment. Nevertheless, the 
debate is a genuine one, apolitical and scholarly in nature, but with real implica 
tions for the basic foundations of different schools of thought on North Ko 
rea policy. 
David Kang believes that the threat posed by North Korea has been unduly 
inflated and that despite the forward deployments on the DMZ, Pyongyang has 
been rationally deterred from aggression for fifty-plus years and there is no rea 
son to believe that they would change their minds today. He believes that if 
one looks at the North's economic and political behavior in a broader, historical 
context, rather than fixating only on military deployments, there is a story of 
slow, plodding reform to be told. As a result, he argues that engagement works 
with the North. It sends the right signals to the insecure regime that the United 
States, South Korea, and Japan are interested in trading the North's prolifera 
tion threat for a path of economic reform and integration. Kang argues that this 
has already been validated by the record of DPRK responses thus far. Kang 
finds the October 2002 nuclear revelations a disappointing setback in DPRK 
efforts at reform and openness, but nevertheless sees a consistency in Pyong 
yang's behavior as well as an opportunity for the United States to negotiate an 
end to the proliferation threat on the peninsula. 
Victor Cha believes that the threat posed by North Korea still remains and 
that although Pyongyang has been rationally deterred from attempting a sec 
ond invasion, there still exists a coercive bargaining rationale for violence. In 
his view, the North undertakes limited but serious crisis-inducing acts of vio 
lence with the hope of leveraging crises more to its advantage, an extremely 
risky but also extremely rational policy for a country that has nothing to lose 
and nothing to negotiate with. Moreover, Cha is skeptical as to how much 
Pyongyang's intentions have really changed. Cha sees the October 2002 nuclear 
revelations as strong evidence validating hawkish skepticism of North Korean 
intentions. In light of these activities, his support of engagement is highly condi 
tional (that is, only if the North Koreans return to the status quo ante); other 
wise, the United States and its allies would be forced to pursue some form of 
isolation and containment of the regime. 
The Makings of a Crisis 
On 3 October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af 
fairs James Kelly, accompanied by a delegation of administration officials, set 
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off for two days of talks in Pyongyang with their North Korean counterparts.12 
The first of their kind in well over one-and-a-half years of nondialogue between 
the United States and the DPRK, the talks were preceded by protracted specu 
lation about what policy the Bush administration would pursue with the regime. 
Following from the 2002 State of the Union Address in which President George 
W. Bush included North Korea in the "axis of evil" and later offered other 
choice negative personal opinions about Kim Jong II (referring to Kim as a 
"pygmy" and to how he "loathed" him), many speculated a dark future for 
U.S.-DPRK relations.13 Other pundits, however, cited various statements by 
administration officials and a June 2001 internal policy review that indicated 
that the administration would eventually pick up where the Clinton admin 
istration had left off, negotiating some form of engagement with the North 
Koreans.14 
The meeting between Kelly and his counterpart, Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Kim Kye Gwan, took place against a backdrop of recently thawed rela 
tions between North Korea and U.S. regional allies. Following a deadly naval 
provocation by the DPRK against ROK vessels in June 2002, North-South re 
lations appeared to cycle back to a more positive path, with high-level meetings 
throughout the summer that resulted in ministerial talks, family reunions, re 
sumption of infrastructural projects (road and railway corridors), and North 
Korean participation in the Asian Games in Pusan.15 On 31 July, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell met briefly with DPRK Foreign Minister Paik Nam Sun on 
the sidelines of Asian multilateral meetings in Brunei. One week later, Charles 
Pritchard, the U.S. State Department's chief representative to the Korean Pen 
insula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) went to Kumho, North Ko 
rea, for the first ceremonial pouring of concrete for construction of the light 
water reactor. Contemporaneous with these events, the North announced a se 
ries of new economic reforms and projects, including a special economic zone 
on the Sino-Korean border and, most significantly, the lifting of price controls.16 
12 Unless otherwise cited, the following description of events is based on several not-for-attribution 
interviews with U.S. government officials and press reports. 
13 State of the Union Address, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/ 
20020129-ll.html, 1 June 2001. For Bush's March 2001 remarks, see "Remarks by President Bush and 
President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea," 7 March 2001, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html, 1 June 2001. Also see Bob Woodward, Bush At War (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2002), 339-340. 
14 For the June 2001 policy review, see "Statement by the President," 13 June 2001, accessed at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611 -4.html and http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html, 3 July 2001. For Secretary of State Powell's remarks about 
picking up the threads of the Clinton administration's engagement policy, see "Press Availability with 
Her Excellency Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden," 6 March 2001, accessed at http:// 
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/1116.htm, 3 July 2001. 
15 Aidan Foster-Carter, "No Turning Back?" Comparative Connections (July 2002), accessed at 
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qnk_sk.html, 1 August 2002. 
16 Marcus Noland, "West-Bound Train Leaving the Station: Pyongyang on the Reform Track," un 
published paper prepared for the Council on U.S.-Korea Security Studies, Seoul, Korea, 14-15 Octo 
ber 2002, accessed at http://www.iie.com/papers/nolandl002.htm, 2 December 2002. 
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North Korean-Japanese relations also appeared to take a major step forward 
with the breakthrough meeting between Kim Jong II and Japanese Premier 
Koizumi in Pyongyang in September 2002.17 The summit produced a North Ko 
rean admission of and apology for the past abduction of Japanese nationals for 
the purpose of espionage training and held out hope for diplomatic normaliza 
tion. This course of positive events led many to conjecture that the stage had 
finally been set for a U.S. re-engagement with North Korea. 
On the contrary, Assistant Secretary Kelly's mission produced North Ko 
rea's bombshell assertion that it was secretly pursuing a second nuclear arms 
program through uranium enrichment technology. Kelly's initial demarche ac 
knowledged that the United States was interested in pursuing a new relation 
ship with North Korea in the political, economic, and security arenas, but speci 
fied that before any such path could be taken, the North Koreans needed to 
come clean on their past and future proliferation activities. Kelly then informed 
the North Koreans that the United States was aware of the North's pursuit of 
a secret nuclear weapons program. This program was undertaken using a differ 
ent method of production?highly enriched uranium (HEU) technology?and 
on a scale comparable to that of the plutonium-based bomb program that had 
been frozen in 1994.18 Suspicions of such a program's existence dated back to 
1997 or even earlier, but intelligence was spotty. Confirming evidence took the 
form of intelligence tracing of North Korean purchases of high-strength alumi 
num (a critical secondary material associated with an HEU program) and Paki 
stani sales of centrifuge technology to the North Koreans in exchange for 
DPRK missiles.19 
The North Koreans initially denied this accusation, claiming that it was an 
American fabrication, and continued on with regularly scheduled meetings (a 
total of four over the two days). Kim reported Kelly's statements to his superi 
ors during the first break, and this set off all-night consultations within the 
North Korean leadership (presumably including Kim Jong II). The three-hour 
meeting on 3 October was followed by a dinner that evening and a two-and 
a-half-hour meeting with Kim Kye Gwan the next morning. The North Koreans 
did not respond to Kelly's initial demarche at either of these meetings. A short 
ceremonial meeting (of about thirty-five minutes) with Supreme People's As 
sembly Chairman Kim Yong Nam at 3:00 pm on 4 October followed, again with 
no apparent North Korean response. It was at the fourth scheduled meeting of 
the trip, between 4:15 and 5:10 pm on 4 October, that the North Koreans re 
17 Victor Cha, "Mr. Koizumi Goes to Pyongyang," Comparative Connections (October 2002), ac 
cessed at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qjapan_skorea.html, 3 November 2002. 
18 Comments by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly at "Defining the Future of US-Korean 
Relations," roundtable hosted by the Washington Post, 6 February 2003, 3-5:30 pm. 
19 
"US Followed the Aluminum," Washington Post, 18 October 2002; and Seymour Hersh, "The 
Cold Test: What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," 
The New Yorker, 27 January 2002, accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/7030127fa_fact., 
28 February 2002. 
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turned with higher-level representation, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju. 
In an extensive and scripted fashion that left little time for an exchange of 
views, Kang said that he spoke on behalf of the Party and the government of 
the DPRK in asserting that North Korea was justified in pursuing such capabili 
ties and that it considered the Agreed Framework to be nullified. Kang blamed 
Bush for including North Korea in the "axis of evil" and declared that the 
DPRK had even 
"stronger weapons" to wield against the United States if 
threatened. (Kelly noted that the program in question had indeed begun before 
the "axis of evil" statement.) 
A news blackout of sorts ensued as administration officials revealed very 
little of the deliberations over the following ten days (press conferences in 
Seoul and Tokyo during Kelly's return from Pyongyang were either shortened 
to official statements without time for questions or canceled; Bush did not men 
tion North Korea publicly for five days after Kelly's return), raising speculation 
ranging from the very optimistic (a "grand bargain") to the pessimistic.20 The 
news became public on 16 October 2002 when the administration, in order to 
preempt press leaks, released a statement.21 
The United States demanded that North Korea return to the existing non 
proliferation agreements before any further talks could take place and, in con 
junction with the European Union, Japanese, and South Korean representa 
tives of the KEDO board, suspended further shipments of heavy fuel oil to 
North Korea under the original terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. By De 
cember 2002, the makings of a crisis (despite Bush administration assertions to 
the contrary) were evident as U.S. officials intercepted and boarded for inspec 
tion a North Korean ship in the Arabian Sea (carrying missiles to Yemen). 
The North Koreans responded to these events in late December 2002 with 
a series of steps at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities that had been frozen under 
the 1994 agreement. Over a period of little more than one week, they removed 
the seals at all frozen facilities (the experimental reactor, the storage building, 
and the reprocessing laboratory), dismantled International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) monitoring cameras, and expelled the three IAEA interna 
tional inspectors. In defiance of IAEA resolutions demanding that the North 
Koreans come back into compliance, Pyongyang announced on 10 January 
2003 their withdrawal from the NPT. Evidence of subsequent North Korean 
20 
Ralph Cossa, "Trials, Tribulations, Threats and Tirades," Comparative Connections (January 
2003), accessed at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_skorea.html, 28 February 2002. 21 
Inquiries by Chris Nelson of the Nelson Report and Barbara Slavin of USA Today prompted the 
administration to go public with the news. Some argue that the Bush administration deliberately with 
held information about the program until after Congress authorized the use of military force against 
Iraq. Others argued that intelligence reports on the HEU program were delivered to the White House 
as early as November 2001, but that the September 11th attacks and war against terrorism took all 
high-level focus away from the assessment. See Walter Pincus, "N. Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No 
Secret," Washington Post, 1 February 2003; and Ryan Lizza, "Nuclear Test," The New Republic, 4 
November 2002,10-11. 
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actions, including tampering with stored fuel rods (a source of weapons-grade 
plutonium), restarting the experimental reactor, resuming missile tests, and 
probable plutonium reprocessing, suggested deliberate and purposeful moves 
in the direction of producing nuclear weapons.22 
After seven months of nondialogue, trilateral talks involving the United 
States, the DPRK, and China took place in Beijing in April 2003, but these 
meetings only served to heighten the crisis. On the eve of the talks, North Ko 
rea released statements about its intention to follow through on reprocessing 
if the United States did not yield in the upcoming meetings. Then, on the first 
day of three days of scheduled talks, the North stated its interest in pressing 
forward with a resolution to the nuclear crisis if the United States was so in 
clined. However, in virtually the same breath, the DPRK delegate, Ri Gun, 
pulled Assistant Secretary James Kelly aside at dinner on the first evening of 
talks (in an apparent attempt to have a "bilateral" discussion with the United 
States). Ri allegedly told Kelly that the North possessed nuclear weapons, that 
it had no intention of dismantling them, and that it would consider testing them 
or 
exporting them, depending on what the United States proposed in terms of 
tension-reducing measures. The North then did not show up for the remainder 
of the trilateral talks, except for a brief formal gathering to end the meetings. 
Another set of talks, this time involving six countries (the United States, Japan, 
South Korea, China, Russia, and North Korea), took place again in Beijing in 
August 2003. The United States refused to engage in bilateral negotiations with 
the North Koreans, preferring to include all countries in the talks. The North de 
clared that they possessed nuclear weapons and threatened to test these weap 
ons if the United States did not offer security assurances. A third set of six 
party talks tentatively scheduled for December 2003 was postponed, with no 
visible sign of progress toward a resolution of the problem at the start of 2004. 
Our (Differing) Assessments of the Crisis 
Debates raged inside the U.S. government and among outside experts as to how 
to respond to the 2003 nuclear revelations. Yet again, the public policy debates 
became quickly shaped by needlessly inflammatory invectives levied against all 
parties concerned. Mary McGrory's column in the Washington Post (9 Febru 
ary 2003) named Kim "the little madman with the passion for plutonium."23 
Others blasted the Bush administration's North Korea policy as the source of 
the crisis, labeling it "amateur hour," and an example of what happens when 
"[i]t talks before it thinks."24 Still others resorted to blaming the Clinton admin 
istration as the root cause of the crisis, referring to President Clinton's negotia 
tion of the 1994 Agreed Framework as a "queer amalgamation of Clement 
22 Walter Pincus, "Hints of North Korean Plutonium Output," Washington Post, 31 January 2003; 
and Doug Struck, "Reactor Restarted, North Korea Says," Washington Post, 6 February 2003. 
23 
Mary McGrory, "Fuzzy-Headed on North Korea," op-ed, Washington Post, 9 February 2003. 
24 Richard Cohen, "Amateur Hour at the White House," Washington Post, 16 January 2003. 
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Atlee and Alfred E. Neuman."25 As in the past, what was at issue substantively 
vis-a-vis North Korea got lost in partisan politics, bureaucratic rivalries, sensa 
tionalist arguments, and a hint of racism.26 
David Kang: Getting Back to "Start" 
In David Kang's view, the nuclear revelations of October 2002 and the ensuing 
crisis intensified an already acute dilemma for both the United States and North 
Korea. For the United States, the focus on Iraq was now potentially diverted 
by an unwanted crisis over an "axis of evil" country in Northeast Asia. For 
North Korea, the slowly intensifying economic and diplomatic moves of the 
past few years were also potentially thwarted. For both sides, their worst suspi 
cions were confirmed in the worst of ways. North Korea concluded that the 
United States had never had any intention of normalizing ties or concluding a 
peace treaty. The United States concluded that North Korea had never had any 
intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons program. 
The North Korean regime is a brutal and morally reprehensible regime. It 
has enriched itself while allowing hundreds of thousands of its own citizens to 
die of starvation. That this regime is odious is not in question. Rather, the issue 
is: what tactics will best ameliorate the problems on the peninsula? 
Many Western policy makers and analysts viewed the nuclear revelations 
with alarm and surprise. However, much of the Western hand-wringing has ele 
ments of Kabuki theater to it, and the accusations ring hollow. "Outrage and 
shock! at North Korean nuclear programs" is not so convincing in view of the 
fact that the Bush administration has been openly derisive of Kim Jong II, has 
been contemptuous of the Agreed Framework, and has known about North 
Korea's nuclear program since June 2001.27 An American intelligence official 
who attended White House meetings in 2002 said that "Bush and Cheney want 
this guy's head on a platter. Don't be distracted by all this talk about nego 
tiations. ... They have a plan, and they are going to get this guy after Iraq."28 
A North Korea that feels threatened and perceives the U.S. administration to 
be actively attempting to increase pressure on it is unlikely to trust the 
United States. 
Does North Korea have legitimate security concerns? If not, then their nu 
clear program is designed for blackmail or leverage. If the North does have 
legitimate security concerns, then it is not that surprising that such a program 
25 Ben Johnson, "Appeasing North Korea: the Clinton Legacy," FrontPageMagazine.com, 3 Janu 
ary 2003, accessed at http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID'5368. Also see Frank J. 
Gaffney, "North Korean Revisionism," National Review Online, 10 January 2003, accessed at http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/gaffney/gaffney011003.asp. 
26 On the last point, see Cumings, "The Structural Basis of Anti-Americanism," 3,4. 
27 Walter Pincus, "North Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret: U.S. Stayed Quiet as It Built Sup 
port on Iraq," Washington Post, 1 February 2003. 
28 
Hersh, "The Cold Test," 47. 
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exists, given the open hostility toward the regime that the Bush administration 
has evidenced. However, despite the furor over the revelation, not much has 
changed on the peninsula. Deterrence is still robust. North Korea's basic strat 
egy remains the same: simultaneously deter the United States and also find a 
way to fix the economy. The United States, for its part, faces the same choices 
it did a decade ago: negotiate, or hope that the North collapses without doing 
too much damage to the region. 
Without movement toward resolving the security fears of the North, pro 
gress in resolving the nuclear weapons issue will be limited. It is unsurprising 
that the 1994 Agreed Framework fell apart, because it was a process by which 
both sides set out to slowly build a sense of trust and both sides began hedging 
their bets very early on in that process. Because neither the United States nor 
North Korea fulfilled many of the agreed-upon steps, even during the Clinton 
administration, the Framework was essentially dead long before the nuclear 
revelation of October 2002. Neither side acts in a vacuum; the United States 
and North Korea each react to the other's positions, and this interaction has 
led to a spiral of mistrust and misunderstanding. Threats and rhetoric from each 
side impact the other's perceptions and actions, and this interaction can be ei 
ther a mutually reinforcing positive or a negative spiral.29 
The accepted wisdom in the United States is that North Korea abrogated 
the Framework by restarting its nuclear weapons program. The reality is more 
complicated, however. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations violated the 
letter and the spirit of the agreement. Admitting that the United States is hos 
tile toward North Korea does not make one an apologist?the United States is 
hostile, and it is unconvincing to pretend that we are not. The Bush administra 
tion made clear from the beginning that it had serious doubts about the Agreed 
Framework and engagement with the North. This began with the inception of 
the Bush administration?South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's visit to 
Washington DC in March 2001 was widely viewed as a rebuke to his sunshine 
policy that engaged the North, with Bush voicing "skepticism" in regard to the 
policy.30 By the time of President Bush's now famous "axis of evil" speech, it 
had long been clear that the Bush administration did not trust the North. For 
the Framework to have had any hope of being even modestly successful, each 
side needed to have worked more genuinely toward building confidence in 
the other. 
The 1994 Agreed Framework 
The Agreed Framework of 1994 was not a formal treaty; rather, it was a set of 
guidelines designed to help two countries that were deeply mistrustful of each 
29 The most well known of these situations is the 
"security dilemma," where one side's attempts to 
make itself safer provoke fears in the other side. The other side thus adjusts to counter, and both sides 
end up worse off. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics Vol. 
30, No. 2 (1978): 105. 
30 
See, for example, Rose Brady, "The Road to D?tente gets Steeper," Businessweek, 9 April 2001. 
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TABLE 1 
Key Conditions of the Agreed Framework 
Agreed Framework Condition Implemention and Discussion 
The United States agrees to provide two 
light-water reactor (LWR) power plants by the 
year 2003 (article 1.2). 
The United States agrees to provide formal 
assurances to the DPRK against the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons by the United States 
(article 2.3.1). 
The DPRK agrees to freeze its nuclear reactors 
and to dismantle them when the LWR project 
is completed (article 1.3). 
The DPRK agrees to allow the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to monitor the freeze with full 
cooperation (article 1.3). 
The United States and the DPRK agree to work 
toward full normalization of political and 
economic relations, reducing barriers of trade 
and investment, etc. (article 2.1). 
The United States and the DPRK will each open a 
liaison office in the each other's capital, 
aiming at upgrading bilateral relations to the 
ambassadorial level (articles 2.2, 2.3). 
Four years behind schedule. There has been no 
delay in South Korean or Japanese provision 
of funds. The delay has been U.S. 
implementation and construction. 
No. The United States maintains that military 
force is an option on the peninsula. The 
United States continues to target North Korea 
with nuclear weapons via the "Nuclear 
Posture Review." 
Until December 2002. 
Until December 2002. 
Limited lowering of U.S. restrictions on trade, no 
other progress toward normalization or 
peace treaty. The United States continues to 
list North Korea as a terrorist state. 
No. 
Source: Compiled from KEDO, "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea," Geneva, Switzerland, 21 October 1994. 
other find a way to cooperate. But both sides began backing out of the Agreed 
Framework well before the autumn of 2002. From its inception, the Bush ad 
ministration made very clear how much it disdained the Framework, and the 
North had begun its nuclear program as far back as 1998. The core of the 
Framework was a series of steps that both sides would take that would ulti 
mately lead to North Korea proving it had no nuclear weapons or nuclear weap 
ons program and to the United States normalizing ties with the North and pro 
viding it with light-water nuclear reactors that could make energy but not 
weapons. Table 1 shows the key elements of the Framework. 
Neither side fulfilled its obligations under the Framework.31 The key ele 
ments on the U.S. side were a formal statement of nonaggression (article 2.3.1), 
provision of the light-water reactor (article 1.2), and progress toward nor 
malization of ties (article 2.1). The reactor is now four years behind schedule.32 
The United States also has not opened a liaison office in Pyongyang and has 
31 For further discussion, see Moon J. Pak, "The Nuclear Security Crisis in the Korean Peninsula: 
Revisit the 1994 Agreed Framework," 28 December 2002, accessed at http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/ 
dprk/Paknuclearcrisis.doc. 
32 See Jay Solomon, Alix Freedman, and Gordon Fairclough, "Troubled Power Project Plays Role 
in North Korea Showdown," Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2002. 
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not provided formal written assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. The 
U.S. "Nuclear Posture Review" still targets North Korea with nuclear weapons. 
The North did freeze its reactors and allow IAEA monitoring, but in Decem 
ber 2002, it backed out of the agreement and expelled inspectors from North 
Korea. 
It is possible to argue that the uranium enrichment plant is a more serious 
breach of the Framework than not providing a formal nonaggression pact or 
not providing a reactor. But this argument will be compelling only to domestic 
constituencies. Given U.S. reluctance to fulfill its side of the Framework, it was 
unlikely that the North would continue to honor its side of the agreement in 
the hope that at some point the Bush administration would begin to fulfill its 
side. The implicit U.S. policy has demanded that the North abandon its military 
programs, and only after it does so would the U.S. decide whether to be benevo 
lent. As Wade Huntley and Timothy Savage write: 
The implicit signal sent to Pyongyang was that the Agreed Framework ... was at 
its heart an effort to script the abdication of the DPRK regime. Immediate reti 
cence by the United States to implement certain specific steps toward normaliza 
tion called for in the agreement, such as lifting economic sanctions, reinforced this 
perception.... [S]uch an underlying attitude could never be the basis for real im 
provement in relations.33 
The United States and North Korea are still technically at war?the 1953 
armistice was never replaced with a peace treaty. The United States has been 
unwilling to discuss even a nonaggression pact, much less a peace treaty or nor 
malization of ties. While the United States calls North Korea a terrorist nation 
and Donald Rumsfeld discusses the possibility of war, it is not surprising that 
North Korea feels threatened. For the past two years, U.S. policy toward the 
North has been consistently derisive and confrontational. Table 2 shows a se 
lection of statements by U.S. and North Korean officials. 
The Bush administration began adding new conditions to the Agreed 
Framework early on in its tenure. On 6 June 2001, the White House included 
reduction of conventional forces in the requirements it wanted North Korea to 
fulfill, saying that "The U.S. seeks improved implementation [of the Agreed 
Framework], prompt inspections of past reprocessing ... [and] a less threaten 
ing conventional military posture." On 11 June 2001, North Korea replied that 
"Washington should implement the provisions of the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Agreed 
Framework and the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Joint Communique as agreed upon." The 
Bush administration continued its stance. On 3 July 2001, a senior administra 
tion official said that "We need to see some progress in all areas ... we don't 
feel any urgency to provide goodies to them."34 
33 Wade Huntley and Timothy Savage, "The Agreed Framework at the Crossroads," Policy Forum 
Online #99-05A, Natuilus Research Institute, 11 March 1999. 
34 All three citations are from Michael Gordon, "U.S. Toughens Terms for North Korea Talks," 
New York Times, 3 July 2001. 
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In 2002, Secretary of State Powell added a reduction in the North's missile 
program to the list of conditions necessary for progress on the Framework. Mis 
siles had originally been excluded from the Agreed Framework, and the Clin 
ton administration had begun working out a separate agreement with the North 
about them. On 10 June 2002, Colin Powell said that "First, the North must get 
out of the proliferation business and eliminate long-range missiles that threaten 
other countries_[T]he North needs to move toward a less threatening con 
ventional military posture... and [toward] living up to its past pledges to imple 
ment basic confidence-building measures."35 
The North consistently maintained that it wanted the United States to 
lower the pressure. On 20 October 2002, Kim Yong Nam, Chair of the Supreme 
People's Assembly, said that "If the United States is willing to drop its hostile 
policy towards us, we are prepared to deal with various security concerns 
through dialogue."36 On 3 November 2002, Han Song Ryol, DPRK Ambassa 
dor to the UN, reiterated that "Everything will be negotiable, including inspec 
tions of the enrichment program... . [0]ur government will resolve all U.S. 
security concerns through the talks if your government has a will to end its hos 
tile policy."37 As the crisis intensified, Colin Powell refused to consider dialogue 
with the North, remarking that "We cannot suddenly say 'Gee, we're so scared. 
Let's have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior.' This 
kind of action cannot be rewarded."38 
As one North Korean diplomat noted: "The Agreed Framework made 
American generals confident that the DPRK had become defenseless; the only 
way to correct this misperception is to develop a credible deterrent against the 
United States."39 As of winter 2003, the situation was one of standoff. North 
Korean statements made clear their fear that the Bush administration would 
focus on pressuring North Korea once the situation in Iraq was stabilized. The 
28 January 2003 statement of the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee in 
Pyongyang concluded by saying that 
If the U.S. legally commits itself to non-aggression including the non-use of nuclear 
weapons against the DPRK through the non-aggression pact, the DPRK will be 
able to rid the U.S. of its security concerns. ... Although the DPRK has left the 
NPT, its nuclear activity at present is limited to the peaceful purpose of power gen 
eration. ... If the U.S. gives up its hostile policy toward the DPRK and refrains 
from posing a nuclear threat to it, it may prove that it does not manufacture nuclear 
weapons through a special verification between the DPRK and the U.S.It is 
35 Colin Powell, remarks at the Asia Society annual dinner, 10 June 2002, quoted in Leon Sigal, 
"North Korea is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy," Nautilus Institute Special Report, ac 
cessed at http://nautilus.org/for a/security/0227A_Siga.html, 23 December 2002. 
36 
Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq." 
37 
Philip Shenon, "North Korea Says Nuclear Program Can be Negotiated," New York Times, 3 
November 2002. 
38 Jonathan Salant, "Secretary of State Powell says U.S. is willing to talk with North Korea," Associ 
ated Press, 29 December 2002. 
39 DPRK Report No. 19, Nautilus Institute, July-August 1999. 
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TABLE 2 
Selected U.S-North Korean Rhetoric over the Agreed Framework 
Date U.S. Statements DPRK Statements 
9 October 2000 
6 June 2001 
11 June 2001 
3 July 2001 
29 January 2002 
2 February 2002 
1 June 2002 
10 June 2002 
29 August 2002 
31 August 2002 
20 October 2002 
"Neither government will have hostile intent 
towards the other." (Joint Communique) 
'The U.S. seeks improved implementation 
[of the Agreed Framework], prompt inspec 
tions of past reprocessing ... [and] a less 
threatening conventional military posture." 
(White House press release) 
"We need to see some progress in all 
areas ... we don't feel any urgency to 
provide goodies to them ..." (senior 
administration official, on the broadened 
demands to North Korea) 
"States like these ... constitute an axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of 
the world." (George W. Bush, State of the 
Union speech) 
"We must take the battle to the enemy 
... and confront the worst threats before 
they emerge." (George W. Bush) 
"First, the North must get out of the pro 
liferation business and eliminate long-range 
missiles that threaten other countries. ... 
[T]he North needs to move toward a less 
threatening conventional military posture 
... and liv[e] up to its past pledges to 
implement basic confidence-building mea 
sures." (Secretary of State Colin Powell) 
North Korea is "in stark violation of the 
Biological weapons convention_[M]any 
doubt that North Korea ever intends to 
comply fully with its NPT obligations." 
(Undersecretary of State John Bolton) 
"Washington should implement the provi 
sions of the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Agreed Frame 
work and the D.P.R.K.-US. Joint Commu 
nique as agreed upon." (DPRK Foreign 
Ministry spokesman) 
"His [Bush's] remarks clearly show that 
the U.S.-proposed 'resumption of dia 
logue' with the DPRK is intended not for 
the improvement of the bilateral relations 
but for the realization of the U.S. aggres 
sive military strategy. It is the steadfast 
stand and transparent will of the DPRK 
to counter force with force and confron 
tation with confrontation." (Korean Central 
News Agency) 
"The D.P.R.K. clarified more than once 
that if the U.S. has a willingness to drop 
its hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K., it 
will have dialogue with the U.S. to clear the 
U.S. of its worries over its security." (North 
Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman) 
"If the United States is willing to drop its 
hostile policy towards us, we are prepared 
to deal with various security concerns 
through dialogue." (Kim Young Nam, Chair 
of the Supreme People's Assembly) 
(Continued) 
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TABLE 2 
Continued 
Date U.S. Statements DPRK Statements 
5 November 2002 
"Everything will be negotiable, including in 
spections of the enrichment program. ... 
[0]ur government will resolve all U.S. secu 
rity concerns through the talks if your gov 
ernment has a will to end its hostile policy." 
(Han Song Ryol, DPRK ambassador to 
the UN) 
29 December 2002 
5 January 2003 
9 January 2003 
"We cannot suddenly say 'Gee, we're so 
scared. Let's have a negotiation because 
we want to appease your misbehavior.' 
This kind of action cannot be rewarded." 
(Secretary of State Colin Powell) 
"We have no intention of sitting down 
and bargaining again." (State Depart 
ment Spokesman Richard Boucher) 
"We think that they [Russia] could be 
putting the screws to the North Koreans 
a little more firmly and at least beginning 
to raise the specter of economic sanc 
tions." (senior U.S. official) 
"[W]e have no intention to produce nu 
clear weapons_After the appearance 
of the Bush Administration, the United 
States listed the DPRK as part of an 'axis 
of evil,' adopting it as a national policy to 
oppose its system, and singled it out as 
a target of pre-emptive nuclear attack. 
... [I]t also answered the DPRK's sincere 
proposal for conclusion of the DPRK-US 
non-aggression treaty with such threats 
as 'blockade' and 'military punishment' 
_" (DPRK official announcement of 
withdrawal from the NPT) 
23 January 2003 "First is regime change. It need not nec 
essarily be military, but it could lead to 
that." (senior U.S. official) 
Sources: Jay Solomon, Peter Wonacott, and Chris Cooper, "North Asian Leaders Criticize Bush on North 
Korea," Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2003; Jay Solomon, Peter Wonacott, and Chris Cooper, "South Korea 
is Optimistic About End to Nuclear Crisis," Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2003; Michael Gordon, "Powell Says 
U.S. is Willing to Talk with North Korea," New York Times, 29 December 2002; "N. Korea pulls out of nuclear 
pact," MSNBC News Services, 10 January 2003; Leon Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating 
Strategy," Special Report, Nautilus Organization, 23 December 2002; Susan V. Lawrence, Murray Hiebert, Jay 
Solomon, and Kim Jung Min, "Time to Talk," Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 January 2003: 12-16. 
the consistent stand of the DPRK government to settle the nuclear issue on the 
Korean peninsula peacefully through fair negotiations for removing the concerns 
of both sides on an equal footing between the DPRK and the U.S.40 
Causes and Consequences of the October Revelation 
Thus, the Agreed Framework of 1994 is dead. Both North Korea and the 
United States are now in essentially the same position they were in in 1994? 
threatening war, moving toward confrontation. Given the levels of mistrust on 
both sides, this comes as no surprise. If North Korea feels threatened, threaten 
40 Ri Kang Jin, "Statement of the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee," 28 January 2003, accessed 
at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200305/news05/13.htm, 12 June 2003. 
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ing them is unlikely to make them feel less threatened. Gregory Clark pointed 
out that 
"Washington's excuse for ignoring the nonaggression treaty proposal 
has to be the ultimate in irrationality. It said it would not negotiate under du 
ress. So duress consists of being asked to be nonaggressive?"41 
An intense security dilemma on the Korean peninsula is exacerbated by 
an almost complete lack of direct interaction between the two sides. Levels of 
mistrust are so high that both sides hedge their bets. The United States refused 
to provide formal written assurances of nonaggression to the North. The North 
thus retains its military and nuclear forces in order to deter the United States 
from acting too precipitously. 
The consequences are fairly clear: the United States can continue a policy 
of pressure in the hope that the North will buckle and give in to U.S. pressure 
or collapse from internal weakness, or it can negotiate a bargain of normaliza 
tion for nuclear weapons. Without resolving North Korea's security fears, the 
opportunity for any quick resolution of the confrontation on the peninsula will 
be limited. This is disappointing because North Korea, unlike Iraq, is actively 
seeking accommodation with the international community. Even while the 
Bush administration was increasing its pressure on the North, the North contin 
ued its voluntary moratorium on missile testing until 2003. The North's tenta 
tive moves toward economic openness have also been stymied for the time be 
ing. In July 2002, North Korea introduced a free-market system, allowing prices 
to determine supply and demand for goods and services. In September 2002, it 
announced a special economic zone in Shinuiju. In the last six months of 2002, 
work was begun to clear a section of the demilitarized zone to allow the recon 
nection of the railway between North and South Korea. To cap all of these de 
velopments, Kim Jong II finally admitted in September 2002, after three de 
cades of denials, that the North kidnapped Japanese citizens in the 1970s. 
If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons, it would have 
done so long ago. Even today, North Korea has still not tested a nuclear device, 
tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, or deployed a nuclear missile force.42 
Even if North Korea develops and deploys nuclear weapons, it will not use 
them, because the U.S. deterrent is clear and overwhelming. The North wants 
a guarantee of security from the United States, and a policy of isolating it will 
not work. Isolation is better than pressure because pressure would only make 
it even more insecure. But even isolation is at best a holding measure. And the 
imposition of economic sanctions or economic engagement is equally unlikely 
to get North Korea to abandon its weapons program. 
Above all, the North Korean regime wants better ties with the United 
States. The policy that follows from this is clear: the United States should begin 
negotiating a nonaggression pact with the North. It should let other countries, 
such as South Korea and Japan, pursue economic diplomacy if they wish. If the 
41 
Gregory Clark, "Pyongyang is the Real Victim," Japan Times, 10 January 2003. 
42 
Indeed, as of this writing, North Korea has still maintained the voluntary moratorium on ICBM 
missile testing that it began in 1999. 
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North allows UN nuclear inspectors back and dismantles its reactors, the 
United States could then move forward to actual engagement. But to dismiss 
the country's security fears is to miss the cause of its actions. 
The Bush administration's reluctance to consider dialogue with the North 
is counterproductive. Even at the height of the Cold War, Ronald Reagan, de 
spite calling the Soviet Union "the Evil Empire," met with Soviet leaders and 
held dialogue with them. The United States had ambassadorial relations with 
the Soviets, engaged in trade with the Soviets, and interacted regularly? 
precisely in order to moderate the situation and keep information moving be 
tween the two adversaries and to keep the situation from inadvertently escalat 
ing out of control. The United States was in far greater contact with the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War than it is with North Korea in 2004. By refusing to 
talk, the United States allows the situation to spiral out of control and harms 
its own ability to deal with the reality of the situation. 
Does the October nuclear revelation provide any insight as to North Ko 
rea's foreign policy strategy? Essentially, no: North Korea has always sought 
to deter the United States and has viewed the United States as belligerent. 
Thus, the nuclear program is consistent with North Korea's attempts to provide 
for its own security. It is also important to remember that a nuclear weapons 
program does not mean that North Korea is any more likely to engage in unpro 
voked military acts now than it was before. North Korea was deterred before 
the revelations, and it remains deterred after the revelations. The way to re 
solve the crisis is by addressing the security concerns of North Korea. If the 
United States genuinely has no intention of attacking North Korea or pressur 
ing it for regime change, the administration should conclude a nonaggression 
pact. It is not that surprising that North Korea does not believe the Bush admin 
istration's occasional assurances about having no intention of using force when 
the administration refuses to formalize those assurances. 
In terms of U.S. policy toward the North, the revelations are actually an 
opening. It is impossible to negotiate with a country over an issue whose exis 
tence they deny. In the case of the nuclear program, the United States has the 
opportunity to actually reach a conclusion to this problem. If the Bush adminis 
tration were to handle negotiations adroitly, it could possibly finally resolve an 
issue that has plagued Northeast Asia for far too long. 
Victor Cha: Past the Point of No Return? 
Many moderates argued, as David Kang has done, that this new nuclear confes 
sion reveals Pyongyang's true intentions. Although of concern, they argue, 
these actions represent North Korean leader Kim Jong IPs perverse but typical 
way of creating a crisis to pull a reluctant Bush administration into serious dia 
logue. By "confessing" to the crime, in other words, Pyongyang is putting its 
chips on the table, ready to bargain away this clandestine program in exchange 
for aid and a U.S. pledge of nonaggression.43 Moderates would, therefore, advo 
cate continued negotiations by the United States and its allies, providing incen 
43 
Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq." 
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tives for the North to come clean on its uranium enrichment activities as well 
as to extend a more comprehensive nonproliferation arrangement to replace 
the Agreed Framework. In exchange for this, the allies would put forward a 
package of incentives including economic aid and normalization of political 
relations. 
Before the world accepts this "cry for help" thesis, however, the North's 
confession must be seen for what it is?admission of a serious violation of a 
standing agreement that could, in effect, be North Korea's last gambit for 
peaceful engagement with the United States and its allies. North Korea's ac 
tions constitute a blatant breakout from the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Frame 
work designed to ensure denuclearization of the North. Those who try to make 
a technical, legalistic argument to the contrary are patently wrong. Although 
the Agreed Framework dealt specifically with the plutonium-reprocessing facil 
ities at Yongbyon, this document was cross-referenced with the 1991-1992 
North-South Korea denuclearization declaration, which banned both North 
and South Korea from the uranium enrichment facilities now found to be co 
vertly held in the North. Moreover, any legal gymnastics over this issue were 
rendered moot by North Korea's subsequent withdrawal from the nonprolifer 
ation treaty, the first in the NPT's history. 
Moreover, the implications of this act extend beyond a mere violation of 
legal conventions. Arguably, all of the improvements in North-South relations, 
including the June 2000 summit, breakthroughs in Japan-North Korea rela 
tions in 2001, and the wave of engagement with the reclusive regime that spread 
across Europe, Australia, and Canada in 2000-2001, were made possible by 
what was perceived to be the North's good-faith intentions to comply with a 
major nonproliferation commitment with the United States in 1994. The sub 
text of this commitment was that the North was willing to trade in its rogue 
proliferation threat for a path of reform and peaceful integration into the world 
community. The subsequent diplomatic achievements by Pyongyang, there 
fore, would not have been possible without the Agreed Framework. And now 
the North has shown it all to be a lie. 
Alternative Explanations for North Korean Misbehavior 
Many of the justifications offered by either Pyongyang or mediating parties in 
Seoul (an irony in itself) for the HEU program and the restarting of the pluto 
nium program at Yongbyon are, at best, suspect. North Korea claimed its ac 
tions were warranted as responses to American failure to keep to the timetable 
of the Agreed Framework as well as to Washington's reneging on promises to 
normalize relations with the North. Moreover, they argued, the aggressive lan 
guage of the United States and President Bush's "axis of evil" statements made 
these actions necessary. North Korean pursuit of the HEU program, however, 
as assistant secretary Kelly noted in the October 2002 meeting with Kang Sok 
Ju, predated the Bush administration's accession to office in 2001, and indeed, 
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was well under way as Pyongyang was enjoying the benefits of Kim Dae Jung's 
sunshine policy from 1999 to 2002. There is no denying that the United States 
and the KEDO fell behind in the implementation of the Agreed Framework, 
in large part because the signing of the accord in October 1994 was followed by 
congressional elections that put in control Republicans with strong antipathy to 
Clinton (and by definition then, the Agreed Framework). The North Koreans 
were aware of this possibility and, therefore, sought during the negotiations a 
personal guarantee from President Clinton that the United States would do 
what it could to keep implementation on schedule. In other words, as far back 
as October 1994, Pyongyang was cognizant of such potential problems in imple 
mentation. To argue otherwise as justification for their illicit nuclear activities is 
a stretch. Moreover, although the Agreed Framework was not a legally binding 
document, arguably there is a distinction between negligence in implementing 
a contract and completely breaking out of one. Washington could certainly be 
guilty of the former, but that does not warrant the other party's actions to do 
the latter. 
Kim Jong IPs justification that he needs to wield the nuclear threat as a 
backstop for regime survival and deterrence against U.S. preemption also does 
not hold water. This is not because anyone should expect Kim to believe Bush's 
public assurances that he has no intention of attacking North Korea but be 
cause any logical reasoning shows that the North already possesses these deter 
rent capabilities. Its 11,000 artillery tubes along the DMZ hold Seoul hostage, 
and its Nodong ballistic missile deployments effectively hold Japan hostage. 
The warning time for a North Korean artillery shell landing in Seoul is mea 
sured in seconds (fifty-seven) and for a ballistic missile fired on the Japanese 
archipelago in minutes (ten). There is no conceivable defense against these 
threats, which would result in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of casual 
ties. As long as the United States values the welfare of these two key allies in 
Northeast Asia (as well as the 100,000-plus American service personnel and 
expatriate community), the North holds a credible deterrent against any hypo 
thetical contemplation of American preemption. 
Finally, the argument that with the latest crisis, North Korea is seeking di 
rect negotiations with the United States rather than a bonafide nuclear weap 
ons capability is both disturbing and logically inconsistent. North Korea seeks 
a nonaggression pact, these advocates argue, and a new relationship, by using 
the only leverage it can muster?its military threat. There are three glaring 
problems with this argument. First, the notion that North Korean proliferation 
is solely for bargaining purposes runs contrary to the history of why states pro 
liferate. Crossing the nuclear threshold is a national decision of immense conse 
quence and, as numerous studies have shown, is a step rarely taken deliberately 
for the purpose of negotiating away these capabilities.44 Second, even if one 
44 
Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the En 
during Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); and Scott 
Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" International Security 21.3 (Winter 1996-1997): 
54-86. 
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were to accept these as the true North Korean intentions, the moral hazard 
issues become obvious. Rather than moving Pyongyang in the direction of 
more-compliant behavior, indulging the North's brinkmanship is likely only to 
validate their perceived success of the strategy. Such coercive bargaining strate 
gies in the past by the North might have been met with engagement by the 
United States, but in the aftermath of the October 2002 nuclear revelations, 
such behavior is more difficult to countenance. The difference, as I will explain 
below, largely stems from the gravity of North Korean misbehavior in 2002 and 
violation of the Agreed Framework. 
Third, the "negotiation" thesis for North Korean proliferation, upon closer 
analysis, actually leads one to the opposite logical conclusion?in other words, 
a North Korean "breakout" strategy of amassing a midsized nuclear weapons 
arsenal. South Korean advocates of the negotiation thesis maintain that Pyong 
yang is aware of the antipathy felt by the Bush administration toward the Clin 
ton-era agreements made with it. Therefore, Pyongyang seeks to leverage the 
proliferation threat to draw the Bush administration into bilateral negotiations, 
ostensibly to obtain a nonaggression pact, but in practice to obtain any agree 
ment with this government. Ideally, this agreement would offer more benefits 
than the 1994 agreement, but even if this were not the case, the key point, ac 
cording to these officials, is that the agreement would have the Bush adminis 
tration's imprimateur rather than that of Clinton and therefore would be more 
credible in North Korean eyes.45 
Though plausible, such an argument, however, leads to a compelling coun 
terintuitive conclusion. If North Korea wants a new and improved agreement 
and knows that this current administration is more "hard-line" than the previ 
ous one, then the logical plan of action would not be to negotiate away its po 
tential nuclear capabilities (the modus operandi in 1994) but to acquire nuclear 
weapons and then confront the United States from a stronger position than they 
had in 1994. Indeed, North Korean actions in December 2002 appear to have 
been more than a bargaining ploy. If coercive bargaining had been the primary 
objective, then the North Koreans arguably would have needed to undertake 
only one of several steps to denude the 1994 agreement. On the contrary, their 
unsealing of buildings, disabling of monitoring cameras, expelling international 
inspectors, withdrawal from the NPT, restarting the reactor, and reprocessing 
represented a purposeful drive to develop weapons. As one U.S. government 
official observed, "[W]e made a list of all the things the North Koreans might 
do to ratchet up a crisis for the purpose of negotiation. They went through that 
list pretty quickly."46 
What Follows Hawk Engagement? 
There is no denying that Bush's "axis of evil" statements exacerbated a down 
ward trend in U.S.-DPRK relations. But actions matter more than semantics. 
45 South Korean government officials, phone interviews by Victor Cha, 9 January 2003. 
46 U.S. government official, conversation with Victor Cha, 14 January 2003. 
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The problem is not what the United States, South Korea, or Japan may have 
done to irk the North. The problem is North Korea. What is most revealing 
about the North's actions is that hawkish skepticism vis-a-vis a real change in 
Kim Jong IPs underlying intentions, despite behavior and rhetoric to the con 
trary, remains justified. 
This skepticism, as I have argued in Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002), is 
what informs the "hawk engagement" approach toward North Korea. Unlike 
South Korea's "sunshine policy" of unconditional engagement, this version of 
the strategy is laced with a great deal more pessimism, less trust, and a prag 
matic calculation of the steps to follow in case the policy fails. In short, hawks 
might pursue engagement with North Korea for very different tactical reasons 
than might doves. Engagement is useful with rogues like North Korea because: 
first, "carrots" today can serve as "sticks" tomorrow (particularly with a target 
state that has very few); second, economic and food aid can start a slow process 
of separating the people of North Korea from its despotic regime; and third, 
engagement is the best practical way to build a coalition for punishment, dem 
onstrating good-faith efforts at negotiating and thereby putting the ball in the 
North's court to maintain cooperation. 
The 2002-2003 nuclear revelations confirm much of the skepticism that in 
forms the hawk engagement approach. The premise of hawk engagement is 
that engagement should be pursued for the purpose of testing the North's inten 
tions and genuine capacity to cooperate. If this diplomacy succeeds, then the 
sunshine policy advocates are correct about North Korea, and honest hawks 
(as opposed to ideological ones) would be compelled to continue on this path. 
But if engagement fails, then one has uncovered the North's true intentions and 
built the consensus for an alternate course of action. The nuclear violations, in 
this context, have created more transparency about the extent to which the 
North's reform efforts represent mere tactical changes or a true shift in strategy 
and preferences. As hawk engagement believers had always expected, Kim 
Jong II has now dropped the cooperation ball. What comes next? The first step 
is to rally a multilateral coalition for diplomatic pressure among the allies. The 
fall 2002 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Mexico and 
the U.S 
-Japan-Korea trilateral statement at these meetings were important 
first steps in this direction. Both Seoul and Tokyo decreed that any hopes 
Pyongyang might have for inter-Korean economic cooperation or a large nor 
malization package of Japanese aid hinge on satisfactory resolution of the 
North's current violation. (People also have wrongfully discounted the signifi 
cance of a similar statement made by APEC as a whole?the first of its kind 
from the multilateral institution to explicitly address a security problem.) A 
second important step was taken in November 2002, when the three allies, 
through KEDO, agreed to suspend further shipments of heavy fuel oil to North 
Korea that had been promised under the 1994 agreement until Pyongyang 
came back into compliance. A third step effectively "multilateralizing" the 
problem occurred in August 2003, when China hosted talks involving the 
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United States, the DPRK, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Although 
unsuccessful in resolving the crisis, these talks were critical to enlisting China 
and the region in a more proactive role in helping to solve the problem. 
Pundits and critics have blasted the United States for its "no-talk, no-nego 
tiation" position until North Korea rolls back its HEU program. Hawk engage 
ment, in contrast, would posit that the Bush administration's relatively low-key 
response to North Korea's violation (especially when compared with its re 
sponse to Iraq's), coupled with its withholding negotiations with Pyongyang un 
til it first makes gestures to come back into compliance, is effectively an offer 
to the North of one last chance to get out of its own mess. In this sense, as Harry 
Rowen at Stanford University has observed, this is the negotiating position. 
Kim Jong II needs to unilaterally and verifiably address international concerns 
by dismantling the HEU program and returning to the status quo ante. If he 
were to do this, then the possibility of new U.S.-DPRK negotiations involving 
quid pro quos of economic aid for nonproliferation would lie ahead. 
Why Not Hawk Engagement Again? 
Prominent figures in the United States, such as former President Carter, Am 
bassador Robert Gallucci, and others have argued for turning back the engage 
ment clock and entering into new negotiations to gain access to the HEU pro 
gram and to roll back the 1994 Agreement violations.47 In a related vein, other 
commentators and journalists have argued implicitly that the United States 
should pursue some form of hawk engagement in the aftermath of the HEU 
revelations to at least "test" whether North Korea is interested in giving up the 
program.48 Others have explicitly invoked the hawk engagement argument to 
criticize the Bush administration's nonengagement with North Korea.49 
I do not find engagement a feasible option after the HEU revelations for 
one very critical reason: the initial rationale for hawk engagement was based 
on some degree of uncertainty with regard to the target regime's intentions. As 
long as such uncertainty existed, as it did in 1994, and Pyongyang remained 
somewhat compliant thereafter with the standing agreements that were the 
fruits of engagement, it would have been difficult for hawks to advocate other 
wise. Hence, even when the North Koreans test-fired a ballistic missile over 
47 
Anthony Lake and Robert Gallucci, "Negotiating with Nuclear North Korea," Washington Post, 
6 November 2002; Carter, "Engaging North Korea"; Sigal, "A Bombshell that's Actually an Olive 
Branch." 
48 Comments by Joel Wit, "N. Korea Nuclear Threat," transcript of Lehrer NewsHour (Ray Suarez, 
Joel Wit, Henry Sokolski), 10 January 2003, accessed on the website of PBS Online NewsHour at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june03/korea_l-10.html; and comments by Wendy Sherman, 
"Defining the Future of US-Korean Relations," JoongAng Ilbo-Washington Post seminar, Washing 
ton DC, 6 February 2003. 
49 Jonathan Power, "A Hawk on North Korea Wants Bush to be a Dove," 5 February 2003, accessed 
at http://www.transnational.org/forum/power/2003/02.03_NorthKorea.html, 1 March 2003. 
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Japan in 1998, conducted submarine incursions into the South, attacked South 
Korean naval vessels, and undertook other acts of malfeasance, I still believed 
that engagement, even for hawks, was the appropriate path. However, the cur 
rent violations by the North are on a scale that removes any uncertainty in re 
gard to its intentions. Its behavior does not represent minor deviations from 
the landmark agreement, but rather a wholesale and secretive breakout from 
it. Negotiating under these conditions, for hawks, would be tantamount to ap 
peasement. 
If the current impasse is resolved diplomatically, however, and the DPRK 
takes unilateral steps toward dismantlement of the facilities, then regional dip 
lomatic pressures, allied entreaties, and public opinion would again compel 
hawks to pursue some form of engagement. Such engagement would not be 
informed by any newfound trust in North Korea or its intentions. Indeed, hawk 
engagement in such a scenario would be informed by infinitely more palpable 
skepticism and distrust than existed prior to the HEU revelations and would 
perhaps be characterized by an even shorter tolerance for additional misbehav 
ior by the North before switching to an alternate, more coercive path. 
Isolation and Containment 
If the North Koreans do not take a cooperative path out of the current crisis, 
then from a hawk engagement perspective, there is no choice but isolation and 
containment. The strategy's general contours would be to rally interested re 
gional powers to isolate and neglect the regime until it gave up its proliferation 
threat. Although this would be akin to a policy of benign neglect, it would not 
be benign. The United States and its allies would maintain vigilant containment 
of the regime's military threat and would intercept any vessels suspected of car 
rying nuclear- or missile-related materials in and out of the North. Secondary 
sanctions would also be levied against firms in Japan and other Asian countries 
involved in illicit North Korean drug trafficking in an effort to restrict the flow 
of remittances to the DPRK leadership. The United States and the ROK might 
also undertake a reorientation of their military posture on the peninsula, focus 
ing more on long-range, deep-strike capabilities, and betting that the DPRK 
will respond by scaling back forward deployments in defense of Pyongyang.50 
This strategy of "malign neglect" would also entail more proactive humani 
tarian measures, including the continuation of food aid, designed to help and 
engage the North Korean people. The United States would urge China and 
other countries to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
to establish North Korean refugee processing camps in neighboring countries 
around the Peninsula, enabling a regularized procedure for dealing with popu 
50 This is risky because the DPRK's response might also be to forward deploy even more aggres 
sively in a "best-defense is strong-offense" strategy. For further discussion, see Henry Sokolski, ed., 
Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 3-4. 
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lation outflows from the decaying country. Potentially a more significant water 
shed in this regard would be passage of a bill clearing the way for the United 
States to accept any North Korean who meets the definition of "refugee" and 
desires safe haven in the United States. In this regard, the United States would 
lead by example in preparing to facilitate passage out of the darkness that is 
North Korea to those people who have the courage to vote with their feet. 
Two critical actors in pursuing such an unattractive course of action will be 
China and South Korea. China's stake in propping up its old ally on the penin 
sula is geostrategic and keyed to a competitive U.S.-China relationship. It has 
no desire to see a collapse of the regime and the specter of a U.S. military pres 
ence remaining on the peninsula. Chinese equities are undeniably shifting, 
however, as the North Koreans pursue a nuclear weapons capability. It is offi 
cial Chinese policy to oppose nuclear weapons on the peninsula, in large part 
because of the ripple effects that such weapons might have on Japanese and 
Taiwanese plans for such capabilities. Combining this worst-case contingency 
with frustration at continuing to pour food, fuel, and aid in large amounts (esti 
mated around 70-90 percent of all North Korean external reliance) into a coun 
try that has shown virtually no progress toward reform might cause Chinese 
leaders to think differently. A more pragmatic, less-ideological Chinese leader 
ship?in conjunction with the United States capitalizing on its more-construc 
tive post-September 11th relationship with Beijing and helping China defray 
the negative externalities that might come from an isolation strategy toward 
North Korea?might be the key variables in the strategy's feasibility and suc 
cess.51 If Beijing were to cooperate in diplomatically pressuring the North, 
moreover, this decision would not be seen as kowtowing to the United States 
but rather as China stepping up to a leadership role in the region. China's aspi 
rations to great power status in the region will be dependent not only on its 
economic capabilities but also on the type of political leadership it will be seen 
as providing. A proactive role in reducing the North Korean nuclear threat 
would provide a security good to the region that would be appreciated by all. 
Where South Korea stands in a U.S. isolation policy undeniably will be a 
test of the alliance. Reduced perceptions of a North Korean threat since the 
June 2000 summit, particularly among the younger generation of South Kore 
ans (despite little material change in the security situation on the ground), cou 
pled with the upsurge of anti-Americanism during the December 2002 presi 
dential elections (following the accidental USFK vehicular death of two South 
Korean teenage girls), resulted in an incredible phenomenon in 2003: in the 
face of increasing DPRK nuclear threats, South Koreans demonstrated against 
the alliance with the United States, blaming the United States for provoking 
the crisis with North Korea. If these two trends continue (that is, anti-Ameri 
canism and no fear of North Korea), then an American isolation and contain 
ment policy toward North Korea would be unacceptable to South Koreans. If 
51 Thanks to Tom Christensen for raising the point about the Party Congress. 
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South Koreans, moreover, oppose such a U.S. policy, at the price of allowing 
a nuclear North Korea, then the alliance might be damaged beyond repair. Two 
critical variables in this mix will be the leadership of the Roh Moo Hyun gov 
ernment and the South Korean "silent majority." In spite of Roh's past political 
activities and his left-leaning ideology, many argue that pragmatism and some 
badly needed foreign policy experience will cause him to moderate his views 
to be more supportive of the alliance (as was the case with Kim Dae Jung).52 
Even more important, if North Korean malfeasance grows more pronounced, 
the future of the alliance and a coordinated isolation strategy toward North 
Korea may rest in the hands of the South Korean electorate. Despite the media 
hype of a younger Korean generation that purportedly fears George Bush more 
than a nuclear-armed Kim Jong II, polls show that a significant percentage (al 
most 50 percent) of the electorate hold a more somber view of North Korea's 
nuclear weapons obsession, and this silent majority presumably would grow as 
the North moves closer to such capabilities unchecked.53 What deters many 
South Koreans are the costs that would come from a precipitous collapse of 
the DPRK regime resulting from an isolation strategy. This is understandable. 
South Koreans must also realize, however, that the costs of letting North Korea 
grow unfettered into a nuclear power would also be high. These costs might be 
measured in terms of not only lost alliance support from the United States but 
also huge potential losses in investor confidence. Already, Moody Investors 
downgraded South Korea's sovereign credit outlook in 2003, U.S. foreign direct 
investment in Korea plummeted 72 percent (in the first quarter of 2003), and 
the stock market dropped nearly 20 percent because of the DPRK threat.54 A 
nuclear North Korea places undeniable costs on South Korea that not even the 
younger generation should underestimate. 
No doubt there are dangers associated with an isolation strategy, not least 
of which is North Korean retaliation. Pyongyang states clearly that they would 
consider isolation and sanctions by the United States an act of war. To support 
isolation, however, is not to crave war on the peninsula. Indeed after engage 
ment has been proven to fail (as it has for hawk engagers after the HEU revela 
tions), then isolation is the least likely strategy to provoke war, inasmuch as the 
remaining options (including preemptive military strikes) are all much more 
coercive.55 
There is no denying the gravity of the crisis in 2003-2004. For hawk engage 
ment, the offer to Kim Jong II to resolve concerns about his dangerous uranium 
enrichment and plutonium nuclear weapons programs if he wants to get back 
on the engagement path is, in effect, the last round of diplomacy. Not taking 
up this offer would mean a path of isolation and containment of the regime and 
52 Victor Cha, "Stay Calm on Korea," Washington Post, 20 December 2002. 
53 Choson Ilbo-Gallup Korea polls, 1 January 2003, accessed at http://www.gallup.co.kr/news/2003/ 
release004.html. 
54 
Hyun-Chul Kim, "Reality Check Takes Seoul Stocks Lower," JoongAng Ilbo, 17 March 2003. 
55 Victor Cha, "Tighten the Noose," The Financial Times, 29 July 2003. 
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an end to many positive gains Pyongyang has accumulated since the June 2000 
inter-Korean summit. Given the high stakes involved, one hopes that Kim Jong 
II makes the correct calculation. 
The Last Word on the Crisis 
David Kang embraces the argument that the North's blatant HEU confession 
is a cleverly disguised attempt to "retail" its new threat and thus draw a reluc 
tant Bush administration into negotiations. He advocates negotiation by the 
United States and its allies to bring both the United States and the North Kore 
ans back into compliance in exchange for a package of incentives including eco 
nomic aid and normalization of political relations. As long as the United States 
threatens the North, Kang sees little hope that pressure will make the North 
disarm. But Kang sees great potential for reduced tensions and increased eco 
nomic opening in North Korea if the United States makes a credible commit 
ment to nonaggression. 
The overall contours of such a package are not the point of disagreement 
for Cha. There are still good reasons for engaging such a dangerous regime. 
The primary point of departure for Cha would be the withholding of such a 
negotiation until the North Koreans first resolve international concerns about 
the HEU program and restore the status quo ante at Yongbyon. To engage 
with Pyongyang in the face of such a blatant breakout from the Agreed Frame 
work would be tantamount to appeasement. However, maintaining a coalition 
of allies to impress upon Kim Jong II in the strongest terms the need to first 
come clean in order to return to a path of engagement with the outside world 
appears to be the most prudent course of action. From a hawk engagement per 
spective, such a strategy also puts the cooperation ball clearly in the North's 
court, and in this sense, also contributes to a coalition for isolation and contain 
ment should Kim Jong II drop this ball. 
Despite the authors' disagreements, they agree on a number of important 
issues. Most significantly, both authors agree on the goals of U.S. policy and 
the nature of the North Korean regime. Both authors wish to see a nuclear-free 
Korean peninsula and a North Korean regime that either modifies its behavior 
or disappears. Their disagreement is not over these goals but over the tactics 
toward that end. Both authors also agree that the North Korean regime is a 
brutal and reprehensible regime that has perpetrated massive crimes against its 
own citizens. Finally, both authors agree that one major element of a successful 
policy toward North Korea is a consistently engaged United States that de 
velops a coherent strategy toward the region. 
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